

**Advance Questions for Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN**  
**Nominee for the Position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

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**Advance Questions for Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN**  
**Nominee for the Position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**Defense Reforms**

**You previously have answered the Committee's policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in connection with your nomination to be the Chief of Naval Operations.**

**Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your most recent confirmation hearing for Chief of Naval Operations?**

*No. Overall, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms have strengthened the warfighting and operational capabilities of our Combatant Commands and our Nation. The importance of these reforms has not diminished with time.*

## **Duties**

**Based on your experience as the Chief of Naval Operations, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of sections 152 through 155 of Title 10, United States Code, relating to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff?**

*At this time, I do not recommend any changes to the law. If confirmed, and after I have been in office for a sufficient time to determine if changes are advisable, I will recommend changes as appropriate or necessary.*

## **Qualifications**

**What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?**

*I believe I am qualified to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and have significant experience in the duties required. I had the privilege of seven command tours from which I gained a solid operational foundation. I have served in three joint flag positions: Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic, Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples, Italy and currently as Chief of Naval Operations. While in command in NATO, I was directly responsible for NATO operations in the Balkans, which included 17,000-24,000 troops on the ground, as well as standing up the military school for the Iraqi Security Forces. As a Service Chief for the last two years, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have been an advisor to the Chairman, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, Homeland Security Advisor, and the President, shaping military advice. Further, I served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, completed five tours at Navy Headquarters, a tour with the Bureau of Naval Personnel and one in naval training. Finally, I believe my background and experience will be beneficial in leading the Armed Forces through the challenges that lie ahead.*

## **Relationships**

**Section 151(b) of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the Chairman of the JCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Chairman and other officials.**

**Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:**

### **The Secretary of Defense**

*The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Combatant Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities and commands established or designated by law, or by the President or by the Secretary of Defense. The functions of the heads of these offices are assigned by the Secretary of Defense according to existing law. The Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the functions assigned to them. Under Title 10, the Chairman, JCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), Homeland Security Council (HSC), and the Secretary of Defense.*

### **The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

*Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.*

### **The Under Secretaries of Defense**

*Title 10, United States Code, and current Department of Defense (DoD) directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DoD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

### **The Assistant Secretaries of Defense**

*With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks & Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that described above for the Under Secretaries.*

### **The General Counsel of the Department of Defense**

*Under Title 10, United States Code, Section 140, the DoD General Counsel serves as the chief legal officer of the Department of Defense. In general, the DoD General Counsel is responsible for overseeing legal services, establishing policy and overseeing the DoD Standards of Conduct Program, establishing policy and positions on specific legal issues and advising on significant international law issues raised in major military operations, the DoD Law of War Program, and legality of weapons reviews. The office of the DoD General Counsel works closely with the Office of Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and communications with the combatant commanders by the DoD General Counsel are normally transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

### **The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

*The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.*

### **The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

*Title 10, United States Code, Section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.*

*The Chairman advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the Combatant Commands.*

### **The Chiefs of Staff of the Services**

*As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. However, this does not diminish their importance with respect to Title 10 responsibilities, and among other things, they serve two significant roles. First and foremost, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no Combatant Commander can be ensured of the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President.*

*Secondly, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important role in shaping military advice and transforming our joint capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Chiefs to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.*

### **The Combatant Commanders**

*The Combatant Commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. By law, and to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the Combatant Commanders and is charged with overseeing their activities. He provides a vital link between the Combatant Commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense, and as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the Combatant Commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense.*

### **The Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan**

*The Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan is a direct advisor to the President. As the role of the Chairman is to serve as the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and Secretary of Defense, if confirmed, I will work closely with him to ensure our efforts are synchronized across the inter-agency and combatant commanders.*

### **The Commander, Multinational Forces - Iraq**

*As a subordinate command of the United States Central Command, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff communicates to the Commander, Multinational Forces - Iraq through the Commander, United States Central Command.*

## **Major Challenges and Problems**

**In your view, what are the major challenges that you would face if confirmed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

*My immediate concern is Iraq. Progress in Iraq requires a committed security, stabilization, reconstruction, and transition campaign. In the broader Middle East, I believe stability is critical.*

*Resetting, reconstituting, and revitalizing our force demands my focus. The war has spread our forces thin. I am concerned about the effects of the stress on our ground forces. We need to achieve a 2 to 1 force rotation construct. We also need a force correctly shaped and sized, trained and equipped, to deter and prevent, and if necessary, fight and win our Nation's wars.*

*I believe we must carefully re-balance the global strategic risk. This is a critical time in our Nation's history, the challenges of the Middle East and the current stress on our ground forces are representative of the dynamic nature of the security challenges we face in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.*

**What do you consider to be the biggest problems that you would confront, if confirmed?**

*My immediate concern is Iraq. Progress in Iraq requires a committed security, stabilization, reconstruction, and transition campaign. In the broader Middle East, I believe stability is critical.*

*Resetting, reconstituting, and revitalizing our force demands my focus. The war has spread our forces thin. I am concerned about the effects of the stress on our ground forces. We need to achieve a 2 to 1 force rotation construct. We also need a force correctly shaped and sized, trained and equipped, to deter and prevent, and if necessary, fight and win our Nation's wars.*

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**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?**

*If confirmed, I would pursue a strategy focusing on vital national interests, which employs all elements of national power, and balances global strategic risk. Our military is central to supporting vital national interests:*

- Homeland secure from catastrophic attack,*
- Sustained global influence, leadership and freedom of action,*
- Sustained strategic endurance and military superiority,*
- Flourishing global and national economies*
- Assured access to strategic resources.*
- Regional stability in Middle East*

## **Priorities**

**If confirmed, what would be your priorities as Chairman?**

*My immediate concern is Iraq. Progress in Iraq requires a committed security, stabilization, reconstruction, and transition campaign. In the broader Middle East, I believe stability is critical.*

*Resetting, reconstituting, and revitalizing our force demands my focus. The war has spread our forces thin. I am concerned about the effects of the stress on our ground forces. We need to achieve a 2 to 1 force rotation construct. We also need a force correctly shaped and sized, trained and equipped, to deter and prevent, and if necessary, fight and win our Nation's wars.*

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## **National Military Strategy**

**There has been much discussion about the threats the United States will face in the coming decades, including radical Islam, the so-called “long war” against terrorism, and the growing potential for confrontations with a range of violent non-state actors. We also recognize now the importance of and requirement to be able to competently conduct stability and support operations. There are also pressures to take a broader view of the threat to United States national security from potential political, economic, and social instability caused by environmental catastrophes brought on by global warming or natural disasters.**

**Are you satisfied that the 2004 National Military Strategy is appropriate for the threats the Nation faces today and could face in the coming decades?  
What changes, if any, should be considered?**

*The military objectives of the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) – Protect the United States, Prevent Conflict and Surprise Attacks, and Prevail Against Adversaries – were developed broadly to remain relevant to the complexities of the emerging security environment.*

*If confirmed as Chairman, I will continue to examine the NMS to ensure it appropriately accounts for emerging trends, to include, where appropriate, effects brought on by environmental catastrophes. I will submit an updated assessment in February 2008 as required by Title 10, Section 153(d).*

## **Roles and Missions**

**Since the end of the Cold War, the Department has considered and reconsidered its capabilities requirements, technology acquisition strategies, organizational structure, and forces mix. The geo-strategic environment appears to be changing faster than our military can change to meet new threats, challenges, and opportunities. Fundamental to change within the Armed Forces is agreement on the appropriate distribution of roles and missions among the military departments and several independent agencies. The last two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have acknowledged major shifts in the strategic environment facing the nation, but recommended no changes to roles and missions and only minor adjustments to the form and size of the defense establishment.**

**Are you satisfied that our defense establishment is optimally structured, that roles and missions of the military departments are appropriately distributed, and that United States forces are properly armed, trained and equipped to meet the security challenges the Nation faces today and into the next decade?**

*I believe we must continue to shift from a force that focused on major combat operations to one that is more able to counter the current unconventional threats our nation faces. The United States military must maximize the effectiveness of our asymmetric advantages wherever they exist. We have learned several lessons from operational experience, and as the last QDR points out we have prepared the armed forces to defeat terrorist networks, defend the homeland in-depth, prevent the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction, and shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.*

*At the same time the last QDR considered how we think about the enterprise, how we manage it, and how we field capabilities. We must institutionalize that approach to enable the continued transformation of the Department. I recognize the importance of continuing this transformation in operations, strategy, and within the enterprise and will do so, if confirmed.*

## **Strategic Depth**

**At this moment, the U.S. ground forces are fully committed to or exclusively preparing for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to ensure that deployed forces are fully prepared, personnel and equipment are cross leveled from non-deployed units. Therefore, the few remaining brigades lack the personnel, equipment, and training necessary for unrestricted availability to meet any new contingency should one arise. This situation puts the nation in a perilous position. We lack what former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, called "strategic depth." This lack of military depth could embolden a potential adversary, slows our ability to respond to a new emergency, and increases the probability of higher casualties in any future conflict. In the absence of sufficient strategic depth, the nation must more carefully manage strategic risk.**

**What is your assessment of the current readiness of our armed forces, and particularly our ground forces, for worldwide commitment to any contingency and any level of operations?**

*Current operational commitments are creating significant demands on the force, particularly our ground force. Readiness of deployed forces and forces that are preparing to deploy remain our highest priorities. Sustaining operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while maintaining readiness to respond to new contingencies around the globe, is a heavy burden on our current force structure. Current operations are degrading our ability to perform full-spectrum operations. That said, we have significant strategic depth resident in our Air Force and Navy, which mitigates somewhat the current strategic risk because of the stress on our ground forces.*

*While it is critical that we maintain our focus on current operations, where possible, we are taking steps to enhance our ability to respond to emerging or unplanned events. We are building strategic depth by increasing the size of our forces.*

**What in your view is the level of strategic risk the nation faces given the lack of depth in our ground forces?**

*The Chairman's Risk Assessment Report provided to Congress in February 2007 was developed in consultation with the Joint Chiefs. I endorse its classified assessment of the level of risk facing our nation. That level of risk is due to a number of factors, including stress on the United States military, especially our ground forces. From a military perspective, continued deployments, accelerated equipment usage rates across the Services and high operational tempo all contribute to risk and are unlikely to subside in the near term. I am confident that our Armed Forces remain capable of defeating all who threaten our Nation's security.*

**What in your view are the three most important actions we should take immediately to mitigate and correct our lack of strategic depth?**

*Mitigating risk requires a number of actions, many already ongoing. Priorities include efforts to:*

- 1) Get to a two to one force rotation metric; this will require an increase in the size of the Army and Marine Corps. Growth will improve our warfighting capacity and reduce the stress experienced by our forces.*
- 2) Resetting, repairing, and replacing equipment worn out or damaged in battle and restoring pre-positioned stocks drawn to equip new units or those committed to operations in Iraq or Afghanistan will ensure our forces are ready to respond rapidly to contingencies at home and abroad.*
- 3) We must also stress modernization across all the Services. Much of our equipment is approaching or is at the limits of its service life. Replacing aging equipment with modern systems and integrating new capabilities will ensure our Armed Forces remain preeminent.*

## **Transformation**

**Please describe the progress that the Department, including the JCS and the Joint Staff, has made in transforming the Armed Forces.**

*I recognize the need to shift the balance of our capabilities to better meet the irregular, disruptive and potentially catastrophic security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century while maintaining our ability to overmatch any traditional challenge that may arise to confront us.*

*DoD has shifted its focus in the following ways:*

- *From a peacetime tempo to a wartime sense of urgency in an era of surprise and uncertainty*
- *From single-focused threats to multiple, distributed and complex challenges*
- *From a “one size fits all deterrence” to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks and near-peer competitors*
- *From responding after crisis starts (reactive) to preventive actions so problems do not become crises (proactive); and from crisis response to shaping the future*
- *From peacetime planning to rapid Adaptive Planning*
- *From a focus on kinetics to a focus on effects*
- *From 20<sup>th</sup> Century processes to 21<sup>st</sup> Century approaches – particularly how information used innovatively generates power*
- *From a DoD solutions to interagency, multi-lateral and multi-national comprehensive approaches*

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff have championed the shift from dependence on large, permanent overseas garrisons toward expeditionary operations utilizing increasingly more austere bases abroad; from focusing on primarily traditional combat operations toward greater capability to deal with asymmetric challenges; from deconflicting joint operations to integrated and even interdependent operations – all while massing the cumulative power of joint forces to achieve synergistic effects. Specific examples include:*

- *Ground forces taking on more of the tasks heretofore performed by Special Operations Forces*
- *Improving warfighter proficiency in irregular warfare; counterinsurgency; and stabilization, transition, and reconstruction operations*
- *Developing proficiency in foreign languages and cultures*
- *Implementing ground-force modularity at all levels; ensuring they are largely self-sustaining, and capable of disaggregating into smaller, autonomous units (Army brigade combat teams)*
- *USMC has established a Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) and within it established Foreign Military Training Units; and improved the capability to conduct distributed operations as well as “low-end” SOF missions*
- *Special Operating Forces (SOF) are increasing their capability to detect, locate, and render safe WMD. SOF is also significantly increasing capacity*

- *USSOCOM has been designated the lead Combatant Command for planning, synchronizing, and executing global operations against terrorist networks*
- *Joint air capabilities are shifting to systems with far greater range and persistence; larger and more flexible payloads for surveillance or strike; and the ability to penetrate and sustain operations in denied areas*
- *Future joint air capabilities will exploit stealth and advanced electronic warfare; they will include a mix of manned and unmanned aircraft for both surveillance and strike*
- *Joint maritime forces including the Coast Guard are increasingly conducting highly distributed operations with a networked fleet that is more capable of projecting power in littoral waters.*
- *The Navy is expanding its riverine capability for river patrol, interdiction and tactical troop movement on inland waterways*

*The Joint Staff supports and facilitates transformation efforts by acting as the primary agent for developing and monitoring concept development and joint experimentation.*

- *The Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) family consists of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, and Joint Integrating Concepts. These concepts look 8-20 years into the future and serve to translate strategic guidance, such as the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Strategic Planning Guidance, into joint force capabilities through joint experimentation.*
- *The concept development and experimentation process actively solicits and fosters participation by Combatant Commanders, Services and Agencies to bring together and leverage off the differing perspectives to address future warfighting needs and challenges.*
- *Joint Concept Development and Experimentation involves the unprecedented integration of strategists, operational planners, and participation of the requirements, experimentation and acquisition communities.*

*As an integral part of the capabilities based planning process, the Joint Staff developed a Joint Capability Area framework and lexicon representing the beginnings of a common language to discuss and describe capabilities and increase transparency across related DoD activities and processes.*

**If confirmed, what would be your goals regarding transformation in the future?**

- *We must recruit and retain the high quality of our Joint force we must rapidly reset and transform the force to meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.*
- *Our future military concepts all reflect the need for addressing future security challenges as a unified team with other inter-agency partners. One of my primary goals would therefore be to push for DoD to partner with other inter-agency*



*members to address how we will achieve national security objectives now and in the future through inter-governmental concepts.*

- *We must continue to build relationships with multi-national partners and potential partners, laying the foundation for future joint operations and shaping the environment for those operations.*

**Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role in transformation? If so, in what ways?**

*I believe the Joint Staff should continue current transformational initiatives and work harder to fuse the development of Joint Operations Concepts that will enable forces in the field to be more effective, aggressively address and solve issues that fall in or across the seams between the combatant commands, and work with the Services to ensure our best ideas, efficiencies and technologies are made available to our future warfighters.*

## **Joint Officer Management**

**The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued his vision for Joint Officer Development in November, 2005. The Secretary of Defense approved a Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education in April, 2006, and published the Department of Defense Joint Officer Management Joint Qualification System Implementation Plan on March 30, 2007.**

**Is the 2005 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision for Joint Officer Development consistent with your views? If confirmed, will you revise this vision?**

*Yes, the 2005 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision for Joint Officer Development is consistent with my views. The premise of Joint Officer Development (JOD) vision is to have a competency-based, lifelong continuum of learning...in a joint context. The goal of Joint Officer Development is to ensure we have the largest possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers for joint command and staff responsibilities. If confirmed, I will continue to enforce the foundations addressed in the JOD vision to ensure our officers are strategically minded, critical thinkers, and skilled joint warfighters. I am committed to increasing levels of joint competency and joint capabilities for all officers, both Active and Reserve.*

*If confirmed, I will remain fully supportive of the JOD as it is written today. I also understand that developing our officers is a continuous process that will go through several iterations and reviews. I am committed to ensuring they are prepared to support the vision and strategy as laid out by the President and the Secretary of Defense.*

**What do you consider to be the principal issues addressed by the strategic plan, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you hope to achieve?**

*The Strategic Plan modernizes Joint Officer development and management in the 21st century. The joint force management infrastructure must be as dynamic as the environment in which the joint force operates to ensure we have the right mix of joint educated, trained, and experienced officers – the Plan recognizes this and meets the demands of today's robust environment.*

*If confirmed, I will continue implementation of the new Joint Officer Management process, per the changes authorized in NDAA 07, to develop the flexible joint manpower structure we need to meet the ever-changing military environment. The Strategic Plan led to legislative changes enabling the new Joint Qualification System—the JQS will be responsive to the warfighters in multi-Service, multi-national and interagency operations and produce the number of fully qualified and inherently joint officers we need. It builds on Goldwater-Nichols' traditional path to joint qualification and opens up the aperture by better recognizing the accrual of joint experience.*

**What do you consider to be the primary strengths and weaknesses of the requirements for joint professional military education with respect to qualification as a joint specialty officer?**

*The Goldwater Nichols Act correctly established Joint Professional Military Education, along with a joint duty assignment, as the standard for today's joint professional. For the past twenty years officers have aspired to earn the Joint Specialty Officer designation. While the premise of that designation (that an officer be proficient in joint matters) remains the same, the title has changed under NDAA 07 to "Joint Qualified Officer."*

*Joint education remains central to the development of Joint Qualified Officers – the strength of joint education is that it is at the heart of joint officer development and is a major pillar of the Joint Learning Continuum that also includes individual training, experience, and self-development.*

*If confirmed as the Chairman, I understand my responsibility under Title 10, to ensure the necessary joint training and education of the Armed Forces to accomplish strategic and contingency planning and preparedness to conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense is critical to the defense of our nation.*

*The weakness is that we still have a challenge with capacity in delivery of Joint Professional Military Education Phase II – with the size of our current military officer force today, the number of officers requiring JPME II far exceeds our capacity to educate all officers at the JPME II level. We do have the ability to provide every officer, both Active and Reserve Component, the opportunity to receive JPME Phase I credit, and have been granted, thanks to the Congress' approval, expansion of Phase II Joint education to the Senior Level Colleges' in-resident programs.*

**What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between education and experience in achieving qualification as a joint specialty officer?**

*Both education and experience are critical to joint officer development. I believe that our system must be flexible enough to provide selected officers a tailored mix of the joint education, training and assignment opportunities they need to gain the experience and achieve the competency-level an organization requires to effectively fill critical joint positions.*

## **Rebalancing Forces**

**In a memorandum of July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed action by the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense aimed at achieving better balance in the capabilities of the active and reserve components. The Secretary noted that the Department “needs to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solution based on a disciplined force requirements process.”**

**What progress has been made in achieving the Secretary's vision?**

*The Secretary's vision encompassed three principal objectives: rebalance the active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve; establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that force structure is designed appropriately and requests for forces are validated promptly to provide timely notice of mobilization; and make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient.*

*We have instituted a new process for assignment, allocation, and apportionment of United States military forces to the combatant commands. The Global Force Management Process provides comprehensive insight into the total number of United States Forces available in our inventory forces and helps us match requirements with available forces. Sourcing solutions are developed and then approved at a quarterly Global Force Management Board designed to ensure the best options are selected to achieve desired effects.*

*Additionally, the lessons learned during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM concerning reserve mobilization and demobilization have been put into action. Specific recommendations were made, each with follow-on actions, to enhance the capability of the Department to mobilize and deploy reserve forces in the most effective manner possible. The Department has rewritten policies that have been included in the Global Force Management process. As part of this process, every reserve deployment is reviewed for an effective alternative source of manpower – civilian, contractor or volunteer.*

*In May of this year, the Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum implementing changes recommended by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. These changes, have met with considerable support as they are designed to enhance the National Guard Bureau to meet the national security requirements of the United States*

*Rebalancing the force will continue to be an ongoing process. The Reserve Components, and the Total Force, must always preserve the capability to operate across the full spectrum of conflict.*

**What do you consider to be the biggest continuing obstacles to achieving the goals that the Secretary of Defense has set forth in his memorandum?**

*The biggest challenge is determining what capabilities we'll need in the future and therefore, determining the appropriate balance between the Active and Reserve Components while maintaining sufficient warfighting capability. To that end, rebalancing of the force is an ongoing activity within the Department. The Department continually assesses its force structure and rebalancing within, and between, the Active and Reserve Components with the expressed purpose of improving readiness and deployability. Reserve Component sources must be adequately resourced and prepared for anticipated requirements. Maintaining interoperability and providing the resources to train and equip the Reserve Forces to a single operational standard remains a Total Force imperative.*

*Not since World War II have the Reserve Components been called upon to perform in such a high operational tempo, and they have performed in an exemplary manner. It is true that when you call out the Reserve Component you call out the Nation, and they have answered that call.*

## **Health Care Benefits**

**In May, 2007, The Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care issued an interim report concluding that “To sustain and improve military health care benefits for the long run, actions must be taken now to adjust the system in the most cost-effective ways.” Among other recommendations, the Task Force recommends increasing the portion of the costs borne by retirees under age 65, and suggesting an increase in military retired pay to offset part or all of the increase if Congress believes that the increases are too large relative to retired pay.**

**What recommendations, if any, would you offer to address the increasing cost of health care and other personnel benefits?**

*Our men and women in uniform make great sacrifices for their Nation, and their personnel benefits, to include compensation and health care programs, have always been a priority for me. The continued support of Congress, and the Nation, is greatly appreciated by our military service members.*

*The rising cost of health care is clearly an issue we need to work and will seek the support of Congress. Maintaining the life long continuum of care is especially critical with the ongoing operations in the Middle East. We need to strike a balance between our People, healthcare, acquisition and operations and maintenance.*

*If confirmed, I will continue to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs as they lead the Department’s ongoing effort to promote efficiency in both our direct healthcare and purchased care programs.*

*The Task Force on Military Health Care’s final report will be released in December. I look forward to review those recommendations and will use the report findings to help shape an equitable plan to sustain the benefit, while attempting to control the significant rise in costs.*

**If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in any shaping or rethinking of health care benefits for military personnel, including retirees and their families?**

*If confirmed, I would support a health care benefit system that is flexible, effective, and cost-efficient to serve the needs of our military members, retirees, and their families.*

*I look forward to continuing our efforts with Congress and the Department of Defense to ensure military personnel can serve their nation with the knowledge that their health care benefits are secure. In this time of war, we are committed to providing the best care possible for our forces that are returning with combat injuries. I will also*

*continue to support close cooperation between the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs to improve care for our troops and for those who have left the Service.*

**How would you assess the impact of health care benefits on recruitment and retention of military personnel?**

*The recruiting and retention environment is very dynamic and competitive, and a quality health care system is an important cornerstone in our overall benefits package. Maintaining our high-quality, all volunteer force is dependent on our ability to continue to recruit and retain men and women with a desire to serve their Nation. Our health care benefits program clearly helps us in these efforts.*

**What role should the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as opposed to the service chiefs, play with respect to health care benefits?**

*If confirmed, my Title 10 role is to provide military advice to the President, NSC, HSC, and the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity I will support the Services and the Department as they evaluate benefit programs. The Service Chiefs have a direct function within their respective Departments in the delivery of health care services in addition to offering appropriate advice as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

## **Sexual Assault in the Military**

**In response to a Congressional requirement for formulation of a comprehensive policy related to sexual assaults in the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense promulgated guidance aimed at more effectively preventing sexual assaults, investigating incidents of sexual assault, and responding to the needs of victims of sexual assault.**

**What role, if any, has the Joint Staff played in monitoring progress within the military services and the combatant commands' areas of responsibility in order to ensure enforcement of a "zero tolerance" policy relating to sexual assaults?**

*As a member of the DoD Sexual Assault Advisory Council, the Joint Staff works closely with the Joint Task Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (JTFSAAPR) team, the Services and OSD. This ensures that the policy is executable in the joint and multinational operational environment.*

*The Joint Staff provides a monthly report to the task force on Service progress in completing investigations of sexual assaults that occur in the United States Central Command area of operations. The Joint Staff also provides assistance to Combatant Commanders during the development of their internal procedures; serve as a liaison staff to address Service policy issues that might impact a commander's ability to conduct investigations; and provides support to victims in the joint environment.*

**What reporting requirements or other forms of oversight by service leaders do you think are necessary to ensure that the goals of sexual assault prevention and response policies are achieved?**

*I do not believe we need any additional reporting requirements on oversight by Service leaders. The prevention of sexual assault is the responsibility of all leaders and every Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine. Leaders in particular must be apprised of command climate and aware of sexual assault or harassment incidents, and remain in the forefront to ensure that our policies are understood and enforced. They should also be held accountable in this area.*

**If confirmed, will you direct any changes to the Joint Staff's responsibilities for addressing the issue of sexual assault in the Armed Forces?**

*If confirmed, I will stress to the entire Armed forces my expectations. Every leader plays a vital role in the prevention of sexual assault. The Joint Staff will monitor the training and incident reporting of sexual assault very closely. Any changes to the Joint Staff responsibilities would be initiated.*



## **Independent Legal Advice**

**During your assignment on the Joint Staff, you may have had the opportunity to observe the working relationship between the Chairman's legal advisor, the Department of Defense General Counsel, the Judge Advocates General of the services and judge advocates advising commanders in the field.**

**What is your view about the responsibility of the Chairman's legal advisor to provide independent legal advice to you, other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the Joint Staff?**

*I view the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Legal Counsel as having responsibility for providing independent legal advice to the Chairman in his role as principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, he must advise the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Joint Staff on the full spectrum of legal issues. Given the Chairman's role as spokesman for the combatant commanders, the Legal Counsel frequently advises and assists combatant commander's legal staffs. In all of these roles, I expect the Chairman's legal counsel to provide his best independent counsel.*

**What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocates General of the services to provide independent legal advice to the Chiefs of Staff?**

*I similarly believe that the Judge Advocates General should provide their best independent counsel with regards to all of their roles and responsibilities; to include advising the Chiefs of Staff.*

**What is your view of the responsibility of judge advocates within the services and joint commands to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?**

*Uniformed staff judge advocates are essential to the proper functioning of the Armed Forces. In the critical area of military justice, commanders and commanding officers are required by statute (Title 10, section 806) to communicate with their staff judge advocates with the purpose of receiving instruction and guidance in this field. In addition, officers rely on their staff judge advocates for advice on all types of legal matters, extending beyond their statutory responsibilities. A staff judge advocate has a major responsibility to promote the interests of a command by providing relevant, timely, and independent advice to its military commander, whether at shore or in the Fleet. Title 10, section 5148(2)(2) reinforces the critical need for independent advice from a staff judge advocate, by prohibiting all interference with a judge advocate's ability to give independent legal advice to commanders, as applied to any employee of DoD. Commanders depend extensively on their staff judge advocates to provide independent advice, which combines legal acumen and understanding of military requirements and operations.*

## **Women in Combat**

**The issue of the appropriate role of women in the armed forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.**

**What is your assessment of the performance of women in the armed forces, particularly given the combat experiences of our military, since the last major review of the assignment policy for women in 1994?**

*Today, more than 333,000 women serve in the United States Armed Forces around the world and they are performing with distinction. From commanders, pilots, crewmembers, technicians, to military police, women will continue to play a critical role in the defense of our Nation in a wide variety of assignments and skills.*

**What is your understanding of the status of the report on implementation of DoD policies with regard to the assignment of women required by section 541 of Public Law 109-163?**

*It is my understanding the draft report is still being worked within the Department and has not been released.*

**Does the Department of Defense have sufficient flexibility under current law to make changes to the assignment policy for women when needed?**

*Current law provides adequate flexibility to make changes to DoD assignment policy for women.*

**Do you believe any changes in the current policy are needed?**

*The current DoD policy recognizes that women are an integral part of our Armed Forces and provides the flexibility needed to address changes to the operational environment. If confirmed, and there are appropriate changes to be brought forward, I will do so.*

## **Commission on National Guard and Reserves**

**The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves issued a second interim report to Congress on March 1, 2007, recommending among other things that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should not be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but that the National Guard Bureau should be a joint activity and the Commander or Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command should be a Reserve of National Guard officer at all times.**

**What is your opinion on the recommendations of the Commission?**

*I agree with the Secretary of Defense's memo dated 10 May 2007. The Secretary agreed in whole or part with 20 of the Commission's recommendations and proposed alternatives for the three remaining recommendations.*

**What is your view of the appropriate role of senior reserve component officers on the Joint Staff and on the staffs of the combatant commanders?**

*If confirmed, I will consult with senior officers from the National Guard and the Reserves to assist me as advisors on National Guard and Reserve matters.*

**What is your view about making the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? What is your rationale for this opinion?**

*I do not recommend that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Due to the impact that the National Guard has on national security, I believe the CNGB should be invited to participate in JCS discussions when Guard equities are addressed in a similar fashion as the Commandant of the Coast Guard. In addition, if I am confirmed, the CNGB will have full access to me and the upper echelons of the Joint Staff.*

## **Reliance on Reserve Component**

**The men and women of the Reserve component have performed superbly in meeting the diverse challenges of the global war on terrorism. Such a heavy use of the Reserve components however could have potential adverse effects on recruiting, retention, and morale of Guard and Reserve personnel.**

**What is your assessment of the impact of continuing Guard and Reserve deployments on the readiness and attractiveness of service in the Guard and Reserve?**

*The men and women of our Active and Reserve force are performing superbly. The prolonged demand on certain capabilities resident in the Guard and Reserve is a serious concern. Of note, the highest retention percentages in the Reserve Components come from units that have deployed for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM -- clearly, these service members understand the importance of their service and are volunteering again to continue to serve their country. We must continue to ensure our personnel receive strong support from their civilian employers, provide support for their families, and we must also continue to closely monitor recruiting and retention. I would like to thank the employers of the Reserve force for their understanding during this time of national need. The Armed Forces will continue to need their support during this long war.*

*To decrease demand on the Reserve Component, the Department has several initiatives underway which help alleviate additional burden on the Guard and Reserve including 1) rebalancing of forces, 2) modularization for a better deployment rotation base, 3) new training and certification procedures for our Army Guard and Reserves prior to mobilization to maximize their utility while minimizing their total time away from home, and 4) increases in the Active Component.*

*I understand that the Department is working hard to deal with the prolonged demand on certain capabilities resident in the Guard and Reserve. Secretary Gates redefined the mobilization policy when he issued the "Utilization of the Total Force: memorandum on 19 January 2007. In this memorandum, Secretary Gates identified the following:*

- 1. Setting the length of involuntary mobilization at a maximum of twelve months for reserve component units*
- 2. Mobilizing ground forces on a unit versus individual basis*
- 3. Establishing a planning objective with a ratio of one year of mobilization followed by five years of "dwell time"*
- 4. Establishing a new program to compensate, or provide for incentives to members required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or be extended beyond established rotation policy goals*
- 5. Reviewing hardship waiver programs to ensure they are properly taking into account exceptional circumstance*
- 6. Minimizing the use of stop loss as a force management tool.*

*Implementing these six areas will provide increased predictability for our Citizen Soldiers, their civilian employers and their families.*

*Readiness within the Reserve Components continues to be strong within the community based forces. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor recruiting and retention in both our Active Component and Reserve Component forces.*

**What missions, if any, do you consider appropriate for permanent assignment to the Reserve component?**

*The Reserve Components must be able to operate across the full spectrum of conflict, and reflect their parent services total force capabilities. The Nation has made a tremendous investment in its military members. These highly trained individuals who, if they choose to leave the active components of their services upon completion of their obligated commitment, can Re-Serve America in their specialties in the Guard and Reserve if these components mirror the full capabilities of their services.*

## **End Strength of Active-Duty Forces**

**In light of the manpower demands of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, what level of active-duty personnel (by service) do you believe is required for current and anticipated missions?**

*The Services, Joint Staff, and OSD have looked at this impact and have brought forward their force structure recommendations. The Army and Marine Corps have planned growth that is consistent with the future demands expected to be placed on our ground forces. This planned growth is partially offset by limited manpower reductions in the Navy and Air Force. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Services to determine the right size force as current and anticipated missions change.*

**How do you assess the progress made to date by the services in finding ways to reduce the numbers of military personnel performing support functions that can better be performed by civilian employees or contractors?**

*The conversion from military to civilian manpower has been ongoing for some time. Military-to-civilian personnel targets are the result of collaborative reviews and analyses between OSD and the Services. This process has been effective and, as it is collaborative with the Services, I believe it is working toward an effective balance of personnel helping to accomplish the Department's mission.*

**What manpower savings can be achieved through reductions in overseas presence, application of technology, and changes in roles and missions?**

*As we continue to shape our force in response to the changing roles and missions around the world, there will continue to be adjustments to where we posture our forces. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Chiefs and the Department to evaluate the global environment and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding the appropriate placement of our forces to assist in carrying out our Nation's global engagement strategies.*

**What is your assessment about the feasibility and advisability from a cost standpoint of increasing the end strength of the Army to 547,000 and the Marine Corps to 202,000?**

*I support the planned growth in both the Army and Marine Corps as we move toward a two to one force rotation metric. The two Services have planned for and are prepared for the mission of increasing their end strength. The President's Budget submission has included the costs associated with this needed growth of our ground forces.*

*I fully realize the pressure that manpower accounts place on the Department's budget. Salaries, healthcare and other supporting infrastructure all come at a cost, but it is my belief that our Soldiers and Marines, and their families, are deserving of the relief afforded by a greater end strength.*

## **Recruiting and Retention**

**The ability of the Armed Forces to recruit highly qualified young men and women and to retain experienced, highly motivated commissioned and non-commissioned officers is influenced by many factors, and is critical to the success of the All Volunteer Force. While retention in all the services has remained strong, recruiting data in 2007 have shown increasing difficulty for the Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Navy Reserve, and Air National Guard in meeting monthly recruiting goals. The active-duty Army in particular is facing difficulties, failing to meet its target for May and June.**

**What do you consider to be the most important elements of successful recruiting?**

*I believe the most important elements of successful recruiting are: tapping the reservoir of patriotism by providing the opportunity to serve the Nation; offering America's best and brightest the chance to serve in a proud and respected profession; possessing a properly resourced cadre of highly motivated and trained recruiters; having complete access to the recruiting pool; offering a competitive compensation and benefits package; and providing the opportunity for young men and women to achieve skills, education and experience. In addition to these efforts, it is important that we get our message of service to those with the greatest influence on our candidate pool: the parents, teachers, coaches, and spiritual leaders.*

**What recommendations, if any, do you have to improve recruiting for the ground forces?**

*I appreciate the tools that Congress has provided (such as increased recruiting bonuses and raising the maximum enlistment age) because they are proving valuable to recruiting efforts. I believe we will have to increase the incentives. The dynamic recruiting environment will remain very competitive, and the Services continue to explore methods to improve recruiting. We look forward to the continued support from Congress to give the Department the flexibility needed to adjust as needed to meet this critical mission.*

**How can the Department better target and reach the "influencers"—the parents, teachers, and coaches who influence our young men and women, and their career choices?**

*The entire Department and our Nation's senior leaders must reach out to, and engage, the American people – especially parents, teachers, coaches and clergy – to help them understand and appreciate the critical function our All Volunteer Force provides to our Nation. We need a national campaign to succeed here. We all need to be recruiters.*

**What do you consider to be the most important components in the success of all the services in retaining experienced junior officers, petty officers, and non-commissioned officers?**

*I believe the most important components in retaining experienced junior officers, petty officers, and non-commissioned officers are:*

*(1) challenge them with great responsibilities*

*(2) properly compensate them*

*(3) provide for a balance that permits them to achieve balance in their lives*

*(4) provide an environment of support for their families: good schools, good housing, and good medical care.*

*(5) achieve 2:1 dwell for our ground forces, and*

*(6) the continued support of American people and the value that our Nation places on the service and sacrifice of all service members and their families.*

*As with recruiting, we are very grateful for the tools provided by Congress as they are critical to continued success in the retention of our force.*

**In your opinion, what impact is the current recruiting environment likely to have on our ability to sustain an all volunteer force?**

*The All Volunteer Force has served this Nation well for 34 years. It will continue to do so. It provides a force that is intelligent, motivated, and dedicated, and meets our Nation's needs.*



## **Mental Health Issues**

**The final report of the Department of Defense Task Force on Mental Health issued in June 2007 found evidence that the stigma associated with mental illness represents a “critical failure” in the military, preventing individuals from seeking needed care. The report states, “Every military leader bears responsibility for addressing stigma; leaders who fail to do so reduce the effectiveness of the service members they lead.”**

**If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure address the stigma associated with mental illness in the military?**

*Mental illness as a result of combat operations needs to be addressed and treated just like any other medical condition. Every leader in DoD needs to conform to this line of thought. If confirmed, as Chairman I intend to provide strong leadership to ensure that we address this issue.*

**What is your view of the need for revision to military policies on command notification and self-disclosure for purposes of security clearances?**

*Personal mental health issues cannot be ignored and as an institution, the DoD must directly address this issue. While mental health questions need to be asked and investigated for security clearances, a balance needs to be established between mental health issues that have a high possibility to be detrimental to national security and mental health issues that the member recognizes and is actively seeking help. If confirmed, I will review current policies to ensure the policies do not institutionalize a mental health stigma.*

## **Iraq**

**What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq?**

*In recent months, there has been a steady improvement in the security lines of operation evidenced by both empirical data (metrics) and the sense of the commanders. However, there is very limited progress in reconciliation, which remains the precondition to an Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and be an ally in the war on terror. Execution of the governance and economic lines of operation has been largely unsatisfactory, albeit nascent governmental institutions and a lack of experience with the democratic process hamper them. Current indications are that the Iraqi leadership is still struggling in its ability to move forward with reconciliation and that this political process will take time. The Iraqi political process is the key enabler that must be a focus of our effort.*

**From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from our experience in Iraq?**

*We face determined, agile enemies in Iraq. Achieving the desired end-state will require a sustained and integrated interagency effort as well as unity of effort with the Iraqi government. Effective strategic and operational planning by the interagency and with both our Coalition partners and the Iraqi government is critical to our success.*

*The evolving regional strategic landscape requires the reconstitution of our strategic depth and flexibility. We must ensure we have the capacity to act in the future.*

*Achieving progress in Iraq and furthering broader US regional interests are inextricably linked. Slow progress in Iraq is undermining US credibility and weakening efforts to achieve regional objectives.*

**What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the United States has made to date in Iraq? Which of these do you believe are still having an impact? What do you believe could be done now to mitigate such impact?**

*I believe the most significant mistakes to date are:*

- 1) Did not fully integrate all elements of U.S. national power in Iraq,*
- 2) Focused most attention on the Iraqi national power structures with limited, engagement of the tribal and local power structures,*
- 3) Did not establish an early and significant dialogue with neighboring countries, adding to the complex security environment a problematic border situation,*
- 4) Disbanded the entire Iraqi Army, a potentially valuable asset for security, reconstruction, and provision of services to the Iraqi people, providing a recruiting pool for extremist groups,*

5) *Pursued a de-Ba'athification process that proved more divisive than helpful, created a lingering vacuum in governmental capability that still lingers, and exacerbated sectarian tensions,*

6) *Attempted to transition to stability operations with an insufficient force,*

7) *Unsuccessful in communicating and convincing Iraqis and regional audience of our intended goals.*

*I believe the many of these are still having an impact. The void left by a disbanded Iraqi Army and has not yet been filled by the Iraqi Security Forces, allowing sectarian violence to continue in too many areas.*

*I believe that pursuing a balanced strategy in Iraq, with full interagency support, and an aggressive strategic communications plan can mitigate this impact.*

**What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?**

*Our approach must be consistent with enduring United States vital and regional interests. We must commit to a long-term security relationship with Iraq that facilitates political reconciliation, supports development of a stable Iraq, and is directly tied to our enduring long-term interests in the region.*

*We must work through the interagency and regional partners to expand Iraqi governance and economic capacity. This effort must be centered on developing effective incentives and disincentives (and associated measures of effectiveness) to influence GoI, Iraqi factions/leaders, regional states, as well as, Syria, and Iran.*

*We must continue our long-term fight against al-Qaeda, contain the sectarian conflict within the borders of Iraq, and prevent large civil scale civil war and the resultant humanitarian crisis.*

**Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?**

*No, there is no purely military solution in Iraq. The enormous complexity, historic differences, competing views of the future Iraq, and lack of trust in new institutions will require long-term political and social solutions. In the near term, political progress requires demonstrated commitment to national reconciliation in order to address:*

- 1) de-Ba'athification and lack of proportional Sunni representation in the Government, Army, and Police,*
- 2) Equitable distribution of oil revenue,*
- 3) Amnesty.*

**Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?**

*Yes. Compromise is a key to advancing solutions to the political issues facing Iraq. For Iraq to progress politically, their politicians need to view politics and democracy as more than just majority rule, winner-take-all, or a zero-sum game.*

**Do you believe that quelling the current level of violence in Baghdad is a necessary condition for a political solution?**

*I believe that Baghdad is the center of gravity and that reducing violence there is an essential enabler. However, as violence is contained, there are two follow-on conditions required to stabilizing the situation and facilitating an Iraqi political solution:*

- The GOI, with Coalition support, must make progress toward reconciliation, eliminating the insurgency, decrease the levels of sectarian, and intra-Shia violence, and set conditions for the transfer of responsibility to GOI and ISF.*
- We must achieve unity of effort within the U.S. government (inter-agency), among Coalition partners, and between the Coalition and the Iraqi government.*

*Progress toward reconciliation and associated reductions in sectarian and intra-Shia violence is vital; failure to achieve tangible progress toward reconciliation requires a strategic reassessment.*

**What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution? What leverage does the United States have in this regard?**

*We cannot impose political change upon the Iraqi political leadership.*

*We can, however, create the conditions of security that help facilitate Iraqi political reconciliation. We are seeing the beginning of this in the neighborhoods of Baghdad that have been stabilized. A moderate degree of normalcy is returning and within those areas, we are seeing increased cooperation between the local Iraqis and the ISF and Coalition forces.*

*We can also leverage our demonstrated commitment to a secure Iraq to host a regional conference on Iraq. Together with regional leadership, we could develop effective incentives and disincentives (and associated measures of effectiveness) to influence the GOI, Iraqi factions/leaders, and regional states.*

*The US can forge regional political and economic support to the GOI to further encourage GOI reconciliation. This regional approach could seek to revive reconstruction funding, encourage business and financial partnerships, and encourage additional support from neighbors (e.g., establish embassies, direct investment, development assistance, debt forgiveness, Iraqi ministry development, etc).*

*Some Iraq leaders are becoming increasingly intransigent as they posture themselves for what they perceive to be our near-term withdrawal. A US lever to counter this intransigence and facilitate political reconciliation would be a demonstrated*

*commitment to our enduring interests in Iraq and the region (e.g. work with the GoI to achieve a long-term security agreement that supports our mutual interests).*

*Inducing the fractured Iraqi leadership to move forward on reconciliation will be difficult and it will take time. We do have some powerful levers available to us including security guarantees, financial incentives, favorable trade status, etc. However, these levers may not be strong enough to outweigh the deep-seated mistrust among the main political factions.*

**What do you believe are the prospects for Iraqi political leaders to make those compromises and, if made, what effect do you believe this would have toward ending the sectarian violence and defeating the insurgency?**

*I believe that the Iraqi political leadership, left to their own internal processes, will have great difficulty achieving the trust required to compromise and move forward on reconciliation. Political and economic progress in Iraq will require patience, persistence and a commitment measured in years not months. Our strategies and force structure must be aligned to facilitate a lengthy Iraqi political reconciliation process while addressing our own vital interests in Iraq relative to the region: degradation of al-Qaeda (Iraq) and containment of the conflict.*

*Political reconciliation will be achieved when a sufficient level of trust and compromise has been reached among the leadership of the main political factions in Iraq. The ability to compromise is a key enabler that will facilitate governance and decision-making. When the GoI reaches this milestone, the leadership of political factions will turn away from violence as a method for advancing their agenda, and sectarian violence should decline precipitously. Without considerable US, international and regional support and pressure, successful reconciliation is unlikely in the near term.*

**What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President earlier this year?**

*We had rigorous and thorough discussions and debates. I met personally with the President and the Secretary of Defense in a thorough discussion along with the other Joint Chiefs. The President then made his decision, and I am in support of that decision and working to make it succeed.*

**With regard to the recent "surge strategy," what role will you have, if confirmed, in proposing or recommending changes to the strategy? What role will you have in deciding or recommending when U.S. troops can begin to reduce and transition to new missions?**

*If confirmed, as Chairman, my role is to advise the President and the Secretary of Defense this includes proposing or recommending changes to strategy, troop reductions,*

*or mission transitions. I intend to be engaged from day one. I intend immediately to go to the theater in order to more clearly understand conditions on the ground.*

**What do you see as a reasonable estimate of the time it will take to demonstrate success in securing Baghdad?**

*I believe that we are demonstrating success in Baghdad today. We have made progress toward breaking the cycle of sectarian violence and eliminating al-Qaeda strongholds in the city. Sectarian violence is down below pre-surge levels. I will need to engage the Commander U.S. Central Command and the Commander Multi-National Forces-Iraq in order to achieve a more complete view on our way ahead and the associated timetable.*

**If confirmed, how would you craft an “exit strategy” for U.S. forces in Iraq? What are the necessary pre-conditions; how would you phase the redeployment; and what residual forces would be needed for what period of time, and for what purposes over the long term?**

*US vital interests in the region and in Iraq require a pragmatic, long-term commitment that will be measured in years not months. The fight against al-Qaeda (Iraq), containment of the conflict, and prevention of full-scale civil war and attendant humanitarian catastrophe necessitate a sustained force presence within Iraq.*

*Following the September reports from the combatant and operational commanders, we must assess the current strategy and our ability to support both our primary strategic objectives and the attainment of a democratic Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and be an ally in the war on terror. Our way forward in Iraq must be consistent with and supportive of our broader regional interests.*

**What is the state of planning for such an “exit strategy?” If none has begun, will you require that such planning begin?**

*If confirmed, I will take a very active role in all existing and contingency planning efforts.*

**What role will you play, if any, in an ongoing assessment of the capability of Iraqi Security Forces to take on more of the security responsibilities?**

*If confirmed, I will work with the Combatant Commander in the assessment of Iraqi Security Forces.*

**What is your understanding of U.S. policy with respect to the arming and support of Sunni militia forces against al-Qaeda in al-Anbar province and elsewhere in Iraq? What would you recommend in this regard?**

*It is my understanding that Coalition Forces are not arming Sunni militias. I believe we should continue our strong support for local Police Support Units (PSU) in al-*

*Anbar province and other areas where the Ambassador and Commander, MNF-I support this concept. Indigenous forces are the key to success in the Iraqi counterinsurgency as demonstrated in al-Anbar, which has witnessed an 80 percent decrease in enemy attacks since this time last year. We must continue to focus our efforts in supporting homegrown police and security forces in Iraq.*

**What considerations will be factored into a decision regarding whether (and if so, what kind and how much) U.S. military equipment currently in Iraq should be left behind for use by the Iraqi Army?**

*Equipment/material will be screened for redistribution in theater. Items of military value will be retrograded in accordance with applicable Military Regulations.*

*Equipment will also be screened for sufficient service life/residual value to ensure retrograde is a fiscally sound course of action. If not sufficient, we will then consider transfer to the Iraqi Army.*

*Additionally, equipment that has undergone significant upgrade since being deployed to theater (e.g. Up Armored HMMWVs, Medium and Heavy trucks, etc.) may also be screened for transfer.*

*There are some other types of non-military equipment managed by contractors (e.g. generators, living trailers, tents, etc). These will also be screened for transfer/donation to the ISF per Annex D of MNF-I Framework OPORD.*

*Finally, certain non-military equipment/material that is deemed to have significant value to help stimulate the Iraqi economy, will also be screened for transfer/donation in accordance with Annex D of MNF-I Framework OPORD.*

**In the fiscal year 2007 defense authorization and appropriation acts Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.**

**Do you agree that it is not and should not be U.S. policy to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq's oil resources?**

*I agree with U.S. policy not to seek permanent military bases in Iraq or to control Iraq's oil resources.*

**If you agree, what are your views on the construction of any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?**

*I view any construction the U.S. undertakes in Iraq as temporary basing of our forces. If confirmed, I will engage the GoI on a long-term security relationship.*

**Is the United States military capable of sustaining present force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan without breaking the force?**

*If confirmed, I will provide the Secretary of Defense and the President my best military advice as our campaign progresses regarding our missions and the appropriate force levels necessary to achieve them. Of particular concern is the stress on the force. The Army currently has a 15:12 month dwell ratio. The Marine Corps has a 7:7 month dwell ratio. My goal, if confirmed, is resetting the dwell ratio to 2:1.*

**Are you concerned about the negative impact of the perceived occupation of a Muslim nation by the United States and its western allies?**

*Yes. I am concerned about negative perceptions. In order to change the negative impact, it is necessary to see the issues through the eyes of the Muslim community and recognize their particular concerns. If confirmed, I will work to bolster our strategic communications.*



## **Afghanistan**

**What is your assessment of the long-term prospects for Afghan military forces to effectively provide a secure environment for a democratically elected government to function?**

*Recent ISAF and United States military efforts disrupted the Taliban's spring surge and eliminated key leadership. Efforts like these are helping create the stability necessary for eventual transition of security control from NATO to the Afghanistan Security Forces (ASF). Challenges remain however, including Taliban sanctuaries inside Afghanistan and Pakistan, along with AQ and Iranian support to the Taliban. We must do everything necessary to ensure the success of NATO and facilitate their continued long-term commitment.*

**What, if any, types of military assistance would you recommend in addition to current efforts?**

*We must work with our NATO allies to both fill the requirements stated in the NATO Combined Joint Statement of Responsibilities and reduce operational caveats. In addition to military forces, it is critical that the United States, NATO and the international community provide the supporting enablers that build GoA capacity and integrate security operations with governmental and economic development.*

**What steps do you believe coalition forces and the international community need to take in the near-term to improve the lives of the Afghan people?**

*Reinforcing the Government of Afghanistan's ability to protect and provide for the Afghan people is critical to marginalizing the insurgency and creating a secure environment. The international community has agreed to assist in the development and strengthening of many vital institutions.*

*We have a critical need for trainers to support the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), ministerial level mentors to develop Afghan government capacity, and the ability to execute critical infrastructure projects which include roads, power, and rural development.*

**News reports indicate that there is growing Afghan resentment over civilian deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations and U.S. or NATO air strikes. Are you concerned that these reports of civilian deaths are undermining efforts to win the support of the Afghan people for the mission in Afghanistan? What steps, if any, do you believe ought to be undertaken to address the issue of civilian deaths in Afghanistan?**

*Yes. I am concerned about civilian deaths. Our military commanders in Afghanistan exert considerable efforts to avoid civilian casualties. These efforts include:*

- *Continuously reevaluating our operational and tactical approaches to ensure that the operational benefits outweigh the potential damage to overall strategic goals that could result from civilian casualties*
- *Investigating every incident to determine if procedures were followed or if they need to be revised.*
- *Coordinated, credible post-incident reports are conducted, followed by rapid reporting of conclusions, lessons, and investigations.*

**In November 2006, the UN and World Bank released a report on the drug industry in Afghanistan. In February, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a report on Afghanistan, which included recommendations regarding the counterdrug policy.**

**What is your opinion of the conclusions and recommendations of these reports as they relate to the effectiveness of international military efforts to help Afghanistan combat illegal drug production and trafficking?**

*I agree with the broad conclusions that a comprehensive “smart” CN strategy is essential in order to combat illegal drug production and trafficking.*

**Should international military forces have an explicit counterdrug mission? If so, should its focus be on interdiction, capturing drug lords, and destroying drug facilities? If not, what is the appropriate role for the military?**

*The current NATO/ISAF OPLAN specifically prescribes the military support to counter narcotics (CN) mission, that includes the following sharing CN information; supporting the CN information campaign; provision of enabling support to air & ground lift for CN personnel and equipment; and supporting Afghan Government CN operations.*

**If the U.S. military were to take on the mission of capturing drug lords and dismantling drug labs in Afghanistan, what would be the impact on the drug trade in Afghanistan?**

*I believe our forces currently deployed to Afghanistan should remain focused on stabilization and ANSF development missions.*

**What can DoD and the military do – via the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or other means – to support the counterdrug efforts of other agencies in those areas?**

*It is my assessment that DoD should continue its support to CN operations in Afghanistan and work closely with the interagency to support CN programs through continued funding of National Interdiction Unit (NIU) training.*

## **Pakistan**

**In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing more to eliminate safe havens for the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other extremists in its tribal areas and elsewhere in Pakistan and to prevent them from conducting cross-border incursions into Afghanistan?**

*Yes. Although the GoP has recently addressed AQ sanctuaries and Taliban leadership in their border areas, expansion of the GoP's partnership with ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan is needed to support Afghanistan stability. We must continue to support the growth to their Frontier Corps and recognize that the GoP political situation is very complex with competing demands hindering its ability to fully support United States goals. If confirmed, I will provide any requested assistance to the GoP in its fight in the global War on Terror and extremism.*

## **Iran**

**What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran's growing influence in the Middle East region?**

*The United States can leverage common interests and objectives with our regional partners. These include:*

- *Regional security*
- *Freedom of navigation*
- *Access to markets*
- *Assured access to oil and other resources*
- *Stable, unified Iraq*
- *Resolution of the Middle East Peace Process*

*We also share common regional concerns:*

- *Islamic extremism and the destabilizing influence from Iranian sponsorship of Hezbollah, Hamas and the Taliban,*
- *Iranian exploitation of Shia populations and the growing Sunni-Shia rift*
- *Iranian hegemony and nuclear aspirations.*

*Iran is central to these concerns and remains the principal destabilizing factor in the region. These commonalities of interests and concerns should be leveraged to develop a regional cooperative security capability while at the same time establishing a dialogue with Iran to explore peaceful options.*

**Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq, if the situation on the ground in Iraq does not improve, could strengthen Iran's influence in the region?**

*A protracted deployment of US troops to Iraq, with no change in the security situation, risks further emboldening Iranian hegemonic ambitions and encourages their continued support to Shia insurgents in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Growing Coalition successes on the ground in Iraq should mitigate this risk and improve the credibility of our message to create a regional security construct to counter Iranian destabilizing activity.*

**In your view, does Iran pose a near term threat to the United States by way of either its missile program or its suspected nuclear weapons programs?**

*I am concerned that these programs potentially threaten our allies and US interests in the region. Iran's continued sponsorship of regional terrorism coupled with its quest for a nuclear capability reinforces the importance of continued deterrence mechanisms including theater ballistic missile defense.*

**If you believe either of these programs pose a near term threat, what in your view are the best ways to address such a threat?**

*I am concerned with Iran's aggressive posture and destabilizing activities. I support current international and regional diplomatic and financial measures to counter Iranian behavior now to preclude confrontation in the future.*

**Other than nuclear or missile programs what are your concerns, if any, about Iran?**

*As articulated above, Iran remains the principal destabilizing factor in the region. In the last year Iran has supported actions by Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Taliban in Afghanistan and insurgent factions in Iraq. Iran is likely to leverage geographic proximity and our regional partners' fear of reprisals and threats of economic disruption to counter regional objections to their hegemonic and nuclear ambitions. We must bolster our regional friends and allies to counter their concerns and thwart Iran's destabilizing activities.*

## **Chinese Military**

**What do you believe are the objectives of the Chinese military modernization program?**

*China is a rising power in the world. We should have no doubts about that. As China grows economically, we can expect that they will want a military capable of protecting their national interests. Those interests include, first and foremost, Taiwan, but also disputed areas in the South China Sea. They also recognize their growing economic interdependence with the rest of the world. Their economic development depends on an assured supply of energy and other natural resources.*

**What do you believe are China's global political-military objectives and specifically its objectives regarding Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region?**

*Rising Chinese military power is not just a U.S.-China issue; it is an issue of interest to the entire Asia-Pacific region. China increasingly understands the importance of stability in the Asia-Pacific region. In that respect, we welcome China's positive contributions in the Six-Party Talks on Korea, and its participation in some international peacekeeping operations.*

*That said, China has refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and its sustained military build-up across the Strait risks disrupting the status quo. While China's near-term focus appears to be on Taiwan, long-term trends suggest China is building a force scoped for operations beyond Taiwan. Many of China's neighbors are watching Chinese military modernization and adjusting their plans and expenditures. Conflict between China and its neighbors could potentially erupt over disputed territories, resource rights, or energy. In response, our one-China policy insists on a peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences.*

**How do you believe the United States should respond to the Chinese military modernization program?**

*As the QDR stated, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could, over time, offset traditional U.S. military advantages. We do not want to overreact but at the same time, we must not under react. Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.*

*Another response must be greater engagement between our militaries. We need to avoid a situation where neither side understands the plans and intentions of the other, and where we are prey to misunderstandings of the other's goals. I hosted my Chinese Navy counterpart in Washington in April and plan to travel to China myself next month. I told Admiral Wu that I hoped our navies could cooperate in areas where we have common*

*concerns, starting with areas such as disaster relief. Interaction at the Service Chief level needs to be complemented with increasing contacts throughout our militaries.*

*Let us bear in mind that the American military continues to be pre-eminent in the world. We should not exaggerate the challenge we face from a modernizing China and a modernizing military. We need China to be much more transparent than has occurred thus far.*

**What changes, if any, do you believe that DoD should make in the quality or quantity of military-to-military relations with China, and why?**

*President Bush has said that we welcome a China that is "peaceful and prosperous." We have called upon China to be a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system. To that end, we are increasing cooperation in some areas and need to address with the Chinese candidly those areas where we do have differences. That means engaging with the Chinese military as broadly as possible, reaching out to establish relationships with the next generation of PLA officers.*

*This is not a one-way exchange, however. The lack of transparency is a real problem. China's defense budget is increasing by double-digit percentages per year. At issue is not the amount of increase, but the discrepancy between the official budget and what China actually does – the lack of transparency – which drives uncertainty and questions of Chinese intent. I hope the next generation of our military will have considerably greater exposure to China; we need a cadre of Chinese-language officers in all our services who are expert in this region.*

**In your view, what can the United States do to increase transparency on the part of the Chinese military?**

*We need to increase engagement between the PLA and the US military. We have other senior level dialogues with China – on economics, for instance, where we have candid and even frank discussions of issues where we have differences. We should be as open with the Chinese as they are willing to be with us. I would like to regularize military discussions with the Chinese, to allow us to build trust over time. That is the best way to encourage transparency in their activities.*

## **Colombia**

**U.S. military personnel have been involved in the training and equipping of Colombian military forces involved in counter-narcoterrorism operations. U.S. military personnel, however, does not participate in or accompany Colombian counter-drug or counter-insurgency forces on field operations in Colombia.**

**What changes, if any, would you recommend for the role of the U. S. military in Colombia?**

*If confirmed, I would make no immediate changes to the role of the United States military in Colombia. I believe the most appropriate role for the United States military is to continue to address systemic deficiencies in the training and employment of the Colombian armed forces.*

**What is your assessment of the progress achieved by the Colombian armed forces in confronting the threat of narcoterrorism?**

*I believe the Colombian armed forces have progressed well over the last few years. United States training and equipment as well as intelligence support and planning advice have contributed significantly to this progress.*

*The Colombian military's (COLMIL) Plan Patriota offensive now called Plan Consolidation the largest in the nation's history, continues to pressure FARC in its base areas. The COLMIL has captured key nodes and dominates mobility corridors, denying FARC access to support and population. A number of FARC, ELN, and AUC high value targets have been killed or captured. Colombian police are now present in all 1,098 municipalities.*

*Colombia's 2007 defense budget is 5.8% of GDP as compared to 2006 when it was 5.4% of GDP. This represents a 12% increase in defense expenditures, from \$7.11B to \$7.96B. Since President Uribe took office, the Colombian Armed Forces have recruited over 100,000 new members. Finally, over 30,000 members of the illegal armed groups have demobilized.*

*The COLMIL has made significant progress fighting narco-terrorists, and their rapid expansion has enabled the government of Colombia to reestablish control of its territory and restore government presence and services.*

*While the COLMIL is more "forward-leaning" than ever, their mettle will continue to be tested as the illegal armed groups primarily FARC resort to new tactics in order to undermine the government's democratic consolidation plan.*



## **U.S. Relations with Russia**

**U.S. relations with Russia are strained over a variety of issues.**

**If confirmed do you believe that there are any opportunities to improve relations through military to military programs, or are there any other actions that you would recommend be taken?**

*Yes. I believe the United States and Russian militaries have made progress in the area of military cooperation since 2003 when Presidents Bush and Putin directed their respective military chiefs to focus on creating the capability to conduct combined military operations for future missions.*

*This progress has been steady and tangible and certainly sets a positive tone for other constructive security cooperation with Russia. This cooperation has been personally directed by the United States and Russian Presidents through the Presidential Action Checklist and has yielded results.*

*I have witnessed the effects of establishing a relationship with my counterpart in the Russian Navy in my capacity as the Chief of Naval Operations. As a result of personal engagement, relations between Admiral Masorin, the Commander in Chief of the Russian Federation Navy, and me have fostered an increasing level of trust and openness. Admiral Masorin is scheduled to conduct a counterpart visit here in the U.S. in August, which will be the first one since 1996. This type of engagement has enabled open discussions on topics varying from new concepts like the 1,000 Ship Navy to more sensitive topics including Black Sea engagement. If confirmed, I will continue to develop this kind of relationship with my counterpart in Russia as well as in other countries.*

**In your view, are there any specific programmatic areas, such as missile defense, further nuclear reductions, or space programs, where cooperation with Russia could be beneficial?**

*I believe it is essential that we continue to encourage the Russian Government to cooperate in addressing the emerging threat to both our nations from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. This includes missile defense and enhancing counterterrorism cooperation with Russia.*

*If nuclear reductions will continue in a predictable and transparent fashion, the potential exists to build trust and confidence in the management of our respective strategic nuclear infrastructures.*

*I believe space programs offer an opportunity of mutual benefit. If confirmed, I will recommend that we continue to seek out joint programs on which we can cooperate, given the advanced technological capacities of both our nations.*

## **Reductions in Nuclear Weapons**

**The United States has made a commitment to reduce the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads.**

**Do you believe reductions in the total number of warheads in the stockpile are also feasible? If your answer is yes, how should capabilities and requirements be evaluated to identify which warheads and delivery systems could be retired and dismantled?**

*Yes. I am confident that the total number of weapons in our stockpile can be reduced by developing a new triad composed of offensive strike system, active and passive defenses, and a responsive. These actions will allow us to preserve a credible deterrent with which to meet our national security requirements and our obligations to our allies, and reduce the overall size of our stockpile.*

*If confirmed, I will work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Services, and Combatant Commands to evaluate our nuclear force structure options with a broad view toward the integration of non-nuclear and nuclear strike forces, missile defenses, and a responsive infrastructure to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons while mitigating the risks associated with drawing down United States nuclear forces.*

### **Stability and Support Operations**

**Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and support operations in DoD planning and guidance in order to achieve the goal of full integration across all DoD activities.**

**What is your assessment of the Department's current emphasis on planning for post-conflict scenarios?**

*The Department is explicitly addressing planning for post-conflict scenarios as part of an aggressive implementation of DoDD 3000.05, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.*

**What role should the Joint Staff play in implementing the new directive regarding post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations?**

*I believe the Joint Staff should assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense in supervising the implementation of the new directive by the Services and Combatant Commands.*

*During the conduct of stability operations, the Joint Staff should assist in coordinating such things as logistics, coalition building & sustainment, and the provision of forces.*

*If confirmed, I will direct the Joint Staff to provide me with analyses and insights pertaining to the policy, strategy, and progress of stability operations.*

**In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DoD and other federal agencies in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?**

*In my view, and as stated in NSPD-44, it is critical that the Secretaries of State and Defense integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.*

*I believe that honoring this general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels is necessary and appropriate.*

**What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?**

*I believe the central lesson is the importance of post-conflict planning and post-conflict training. In order to effectively plan and execute post-conflict operations must understand their role in post-conflict operations.*

### **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea**

**In May of this year, President Bush issued a statement urging the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.**

**Do you support U. S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?**

*Yes, I support United States' accession to the Law of the Sea Convention, and I believe that joining the Convention will strengthen our military's ability to conduct operations.*

**How would you answer the critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?**

*I believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention is in national security interest of our nation. The basic tenets of the Law of the Sea Convention are clear and the United States Armed Forces reap many benefits from its provisions. From the right of unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international navigation, to reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, providing a framework for countering excessive claims of other states, and preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones, the Convention provides the stable and predictable legal regime we need to conduct our operations today and in the future.*

*The ability of United States military forces to operate freely on, over and above the vast military maneuver space of the oceans is critical to our national security interests, the military in general, and the Navy in particular. Your Navy's -- and your military's -- ability to operate freely across the vast domain of the world's oceans in peace and in war make possible the unfettered projection of American influence and power. The military basis for support for the Law of the Sea Convention is broad because it codifies fundamental benefits important to our operating forces as they train and fight:*

- It codifies essential navigational freedoms through key international straits and archipelagoes, in the exclusive economic zone, and on the high seas;*
- It supports the operational maneuver space for combat and other operations of our warships and aircraft; and*
- It enhances our own maritime interests in our territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone.*

*These provisions and others are important, and it is preferable for the United States to be a party to the Convention that codifies the freedoms of navigation and over flight needed to support United States military operations. Likewise, it is beneficial to have a seat at the table to shape future developments of the Law of the Sea Convention. Amendments made to the Convention in the 1990's satisfied many of the concerns that opponents have expressed.*

*Since 1983, the United States Navy has conducted its activities in accordance with President Reagan's Statement on United States Oceans Policy, operating consistent with the Convention's provisions on navigational freedoms. If the United States becomes a party to the Law of the Sea Convention, we would continue to operate as we have since 1983, and would be recognized for our leadership role in law of the sea matters. Joining the Law of the Sea Convention will have no adverse effect on the President's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) or on United States intelligence gathering activities. Rather, joining the Convention is another important step in prosecuting and ultimately prevailing in the Global War on Terrorism.*

### **Treatment of Detainees**

**The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.**

**What steps, if any, do you believe the Joint Staff should take to ensure the humane treatment of detainees in DoD custody and to ensure that such detainees are not subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment?**

*The Department of Defense has policies in place to require compliance with U.S. law concerning humane treatment of detainees in DoD custody. In a July 7, 2006 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense required all components of the Department of Defense to treat detainees in accordance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The 2006 Department of Defense Directive (2310.01E) governing the Department's Detainee Program requires that all persons subject to the Directive to apply, at a minimum, the standards of Common Article 3 to detainees in the custody of the Department of Defense. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 also prohibits the use of any interrogation technique not listed in the Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation with any person in the custody of the Department of Defense. That Manual has been revised, it is public, and it binds the operations of the Department of Defense.*

*I believe the Joint Staff should work to ensure all United States military personnel engaged in detention operations comply with United States domestic law, the Law of War, and our international treaty obligations including the Prohibition on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.*

## **Future of NATO**

**Over the past several years, NATO has experienced great changes. NATO has enlarged with the addition of seven new members from Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and has taken on an ambitious stabilization mission in Afghanistan, as well as a training mission in Iraq.**

**In your view, what are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for NATO over the next five years?**

*In my view, NATO has proven its relevance by its ability to transform from its Cold War posture to meet the out-of-area challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. NATO's greatest opportunities – and challenges – lay in its ability to continue to transform in the coming years.*

*Most critically, NATO must demonstrate that it can deliver the results needed in Afghanistan. NATO's military forces cannot alone provide the long-term solution, but must play a role together with other actors in the international community.*

*In the area of military capabilities, NATO and Allied nations must continue to focus on expeditionary capacity. Enlargement of NATO and expanding Alliance relationships with partner nations of all types will present NATO with challenges and opportunities. Shaping how NATO engages with partners, from the Mediterranean Dialogue to global partnership initiatives, will in turn set the stage for future Alliance initiatives critical to Allied security.*

*These opportunities will not come cheaply – which is perhaps one of the greatest challenges facing the Alliance. Most Allies spend little on defense. Transforming national militaries while also contributing them to on-going Alliance operations far from home is an expensive prospect, but one that is absolutely critical to the future success of NATO.*

**Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the next five years?**

*Accession to NATO is a political question for the 26 NATO Allies.*

**What progress are the NATO member nations, particularly the new member nations, making with respect to transforming their militaries, acquiring advanced capabilities, and enhancing their interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO member nations?**

*Most Allies (due to limited resources made available to defense ministries) are forced to make critical choices between spending money on transforming their militaries or on contributing to Alliance operations within existing capabilities.*

*Many Allies, however, have been able to strike a delicate balance between these two choices, but with reduced effectiveness. The cost is that national transformational processes are delayed, or have key elements cancelled, while contributions to operations are smaller, or less capable, than needed.*

*The bottom line is that all but a few Allies meet the agreed-upon 2% of GDP allocated for defense spending – if this target was met, across the board, almost all transformational and operation requirements could be met.*

**What steps could NATO take, in your view, to reduce tensions with Russia?**

*I believe the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) can play a vital role in mitigating tensions with Russia by addressing key strategic issues, to include:*

- *NATO and Russian perceptions of the ballistic missile threat from the Middle East,*
- *Cooperation in regional stabilization and reconstruction efforts (e.g., in Iraq and Afghanistan),*
- *Managing Russia's reaction to possible NATO enlargement, as well as Russian suspicions about United States and NATO activities in Europe and Central Asia,*
- *Determining how to best facilitate Russia's fulfillment of its "Istanbul Commitments" in withdrawing military forces from Moldova and Georgia.*



## **Ballistic Missile Defense**

**Section 234 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 requires operationally realistic testing of each block of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).**

**Do you believe that in order to perform its intended function successfully, the BMDS, including each of its elements, needs to be operationally effective?**

*Yes. I believe the United States has a viable initial operational capability and we are maturing the system toward a full operational capability. Thorough testing is critical to operational effectiveness, and, if confirmed, I will continue my commitment to testing as the BMDS system evolves.*

**Do you believe that the United States should deploy missile defense systems without regard to whether they are operationally effective?**

*In view of the threats we face today and will face in the future, I believe the United States should deploy components of the ballistic missile defense system as soon as they become available even as we improve their operational effectiveness. Due to our continuing successes with BMDS, I remain confident in our initial operational capability and its continued maturation.*

**Do you believe that operationally realistic testing is necessary to demonstrate and determine the operational capabilities and limits of the BMDS, and to improve its operational capability?**

*Yes. I believe that operationally realistic testing is necessary to demonstrate and determine the operational capabilities and limits of the BMDS, and to improve its operational capability.*

**If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the BMDS, and each of its elements, undergoes operationally realistic testing?**

*If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency, the Military Services, and the Combatant Commands to ensure operationally realistic testing is accomplished.*

**The military is supposed to play an important role in helping to determine requirements for our military capabilities, and to help determine the capabilities that will meet the needs of the combatant commanders for their operational plans.**

**What do you believe should be the role of the military (as the warfighter) in helping to determine the requirements and force structure needs for our ballistic missile defense forces, including such elements as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Joint Force Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and the military departments?**

*I believe the military has a central role in helping to determine the requirements and force structure needs of our ballistic missile defense forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provide military advice and oversight of requirements and force structure. The Combatant Commands integrate ballistic missile defense capabilities into operational plans and help formulate requirements.*

*The Joint Force Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense plans, integrates, coordinates, and conducts ballistic missile defense operations for United States Strategic Command. The Military Services and the Missile Defense Agency provide resources, support, and leadership to all elements of the ballistic missile defense system.*

**If confirmed, what steps would you take to help ensure that U.S. missile defense forces and capabilities meet the needs and operational plans of the combatant commanders?**

*If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency and United States Strategic Command as they continue to fully collaborate with the Military Services and all Combatant Commands to ensure the needs of the warfighter are met, to include training, testing, wargaming, and conducting realistic exercises and simulations, to improve the capability and reliability of the missile defense system.*

**Section 223 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 establishes that “it is the policy of the United States that the Department of Defense accord a priority within the missile defense program to the development, testing, fielding and improvement of effective near-term missile defense capabilities, including the ground-based midcourse defense system, the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, the Patriot PAC-3 system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and the sensors necessary to support such systems.”**

**If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Department complies with this policy requirement in its development and acquisition of missile defense capabilities?**

*If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency, the Military Services, and the Combatant Commands to ensure the development, testing, acquisition, fielding, and improvement of effective near-term missile defense capabilities to meet the threats that we face today and will continue to face in the future.*

## **Acquisition Management**

**Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation or acquisition management processes?**

*No. I believe the role of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation and acquisition management process is very effective. The processes are improving and are meeting future joint warfighting needs. If confirmed, I will focus on responsiveness to immediate and near term joint warfighting needs by working closely with the Services in executing the joint urgent operational needs processes.*

*I also view the JROC initiatives that provide enhanced assessments of proposed capabilities and weapon systems by considering not only the Key Performance Parameters, but also technology, cost, and schedule risks, increased emphasis on affordability, and the "watch list" to monitor program cost baselines as very likely to achieve improvement in acquisition management and fielding capability quicker.*

*While I believe the Chairman and Vice Chairman roles are adequate, the Service Chiefs need to have more authority and control in acquisitions, by being placed in the acquisition chain-of-command.*

## **Defense Science and Technology Programs**

**Our investment in defense science and technology (S&T) programs is designed to support defense transformation goals and objectives and to ensure that warfighters of today and tomorrow have superior and affordable technology to support their missions and to give them revolutionary war-winning capabilities.**

**Do you believe there is adequate investment in innovative defense science to develop the capabilities warfighters will need in 2020?**

*Yes. The FY 2008 S&T budget (\$10.7B) represents approximately 2.3% of the Department's top line for FY 2008 and is planned to increase by 8.8% during FYs 2008-2013.*

**Do you believe current Defense S&T investment is appropriately balance between balanced between near-term and long-term needs?**

*Yes. The FY 2008 S&T budget is well balanced, with 14% obligated for Basic Research, 40% for applied research, and 46% for applied technology development. This balance supports the Department's strategy to fulfill both near- and long-term science and technology needs. The various science and technology enterprises within the Department continue to deliver near-term solutions to the warfighter while maintaining a long-term perspective to research and develop capabilities for the future.*

## **Technology Transition**

**The DoD efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.**

**What are your views on the success of the Department's technology transition programs in spiraling emerging technologies into use to confront evolving threats and to meet warfighter needs?**

*I would contend that the pace of globalization has accelerated the speed of war to the point that by fixating on today's threat, we run the risk of growing myopic and ineffective. To outpace the diverse and uncertain challenges we face now and in the future, we need an acquisition system capable of transitioning new technologies into existing programs to answer warfighter needs. While steps have been taken to meet these challenges, clearly more must be done. Our warfighters deserve this capability to confront evolving threats. If confirmed, I will ensure Service and Agency leadership continue to embrace early transition planning and demonstrate methods for transitioning technology.*

**What more can be done to transition critical technologies quickly to warfighters?**

*The Technology Transition Council has been re-engineered to execute a federated approach to coordinating transition efforts across the enterprise. If confirmed, I will continue to foster an environment of creative thinking needed to keep pace with the speed of war, delivering critical technologies to the warfighter.*

## **Interagency Reform**

**What, if any, reform do you believe is necessary to improve interagency cooperation on national security issues, specifically including: 1) post-conflict situations; 2), managing the aftermath of terrorist attacks, and; 3) managing pandemics?**

*In my view, interagency cooperation on national security issues is improving, but much more is needed. I am concerned that once a decision is made, the level of effort in the implementation of policy lags. Specifically, more attention is required in the following areas:*

- Reform efforts that focus on developing the capability to prepare for, plan, and execute interagency approaches to national and homeland security challenges.*
- Ongoing efforts within the USG to develop strategic planning & exercise capabilities, as well as establishing protocols to achieve unity of effort between DoD, the National Guard, and interagency partners in responding to contingencies in the homeland.*
- Development of domestic and global contingency plans to address the pandemic environment for synchronizing United States military response both within DoD and with our interagency partners.*

*I believe there needs to be a Goldwater-Nichols-like act for the Inter-agency.*

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

*Yes*